Did It Work?

In the aftermath of President Obama's announcement that combat operations in Iraq had ended, some commentators began to discuss the war itself. Those attempting to defend the war, its inception and its conduct, offered three reasons why invading Iraq was a good thing, why the war achieved some positive objective, and why therefore Bush deserves credit, more than Obama was willing to give him.

We need to note that the arguments shift all over the place, as if they can't keep track of which stasis they're in. So let's identify them:

A. The war in Iraq was a good thing. The key word here is "good" - that tells us we're in a Values (present tense) argument.

B. The reasons we went to war were valid. The key words are "reasons" and "were" - Cause and past tense. Note that Cause argument is used to validate (justify) the Values argument. This holds true for both sides, by the way. Those who argue the war was bad often point out that the reasons for the war were invalid. While there is a relationship between the two, one does not necessarily depend on the other. That is, even if the reasons were bad (or good) - Cause - the result - the Value - might be good (or bad).

That's the argument the Bush supporters fall back on when they begin to lose the Cause argument.

The Values argument has several components, often derived from the Cause arguments and usually posed as a rhetorical question. A typical fall back: "Isn't the world safer with Saddam Hussein?"

C. The Surge worked. The key word here is the active past tense verb. That indicates Fact, also past tense. Notice the connecting logic: The Surge worked (Fact) therefore the war achieved a goal (Fact) therefore the was was good - the right thing to do (Value). Now if in fact the Surge worked, a goal was in fact achieved. But whether that goal was good, or whether, even the goal achieved by the Surge was good, the war itself was good, is another matter.

Let's begin with the Cause arguments (B). Why did we go to war? There were several reasons, each based on assertions about Facts. Rachel Maddow does a good job of listing and debunking the sequence of reasons. (See it here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDCboLKk-p4 or here: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26315908/ns/msnbc_tv-rachel_maddow_show/)

To summarize:

1. Saddam had ties to Al-Qaeda (the 9/11 Excuse)

2. Saddam was about to develop weapons of mass destruction (the Smoking Mushroom Excuse)

3. Saddam was a dictator (the Convenient Moral Imperative Excuse)

4. We needed to bring democracy to the world, starting with Iraq (the History Doesn't Matter Excuse)

Now others accused Bush & Cheney & Rumsfeld of having other motives, such as taking control of Iraq's oil preserves (Greg Palast in Armed Madhouse) or pursuing disaster capitalism, aka, corporatism (Naomi Klein in The Shock Doctrine).

If we shift the frame - expand it, for instance, to include the other possibilities, or narrow it to exclude one of the four offered - we may still be in the stasis of Cause - WHY did Bush & Cheney lead the country into the Iraq war? However, even if we stay in the stasis of Cause, there are several places of contention: Whose war was it? Did the country accept it knowingly? In other words, was there full disclosure or was there fraud? (The analogy to a suit in civil (or even criminal) court is not coincidental.)

From the frame (perspective) of Palast, Klein and others, the answer is no. But the Cause stases advanced by the advocates leaves the question open - or rather, forces it into the stasis of Fact. The question becomes not "Did Saddam have ties to Al-Qaeda" or "Was Saddam about to develop WMDs" - we know now the answer to both was no. The question becomes, what did those who urged (Bush/Cheney, et.al) and approved (Congress) know? Did they know the same thing? What kind of factual proof is Congress's acquiescence?

As long as the advocates can switch from Fact to Cause and back again, the argument cannot be settled in either stasis. But if it is about to be settled - if the argument can be confined, for the purposes of the argument, to one stasis long enough to come to a resolution, the advocates can switch to another stasis - Values.

This is argument B4 and C. They are often combined, because (CAUSE!) the so-called Surge is offered as fact (evidence) of the motive (Cause). The argument runs: Because the surge worked (FACT) - the Iraqis had an election and sectarian violence went down - therefore our reason for invading Iraq (CAUSE) - to bring democracy to the dictatorship - was good and right (VALUE). This has an implied conclusion or place in the stasis of POLICY - pursue the same policy next time, and to do so one must vote Republican. But that implication is rarely voiced, so let's set it aside.

If you're familiar with fallacies, Rhetorical Fouls, as Jay Heinrichs calls them, you'll recognize them operating here. First, if the action was good (VALUE) then its success or failure (FACT) does not determine its value, or goodness. Had the surge failed, if the motive had been to bring peace and freedom to Iraq, the action would still have been good. On the other hand, had the motive been to seize control of Iraqi oil assets, then even had the surge succeeded, the motive would have been bad.

I should also note that whether or not the so-called "Surge" succeeded depends on the stasis of Definition. The "facts" are generally agreed upon: there was sectarian violence and no political movement. More U.S. troops went in and the violence went down and an election was held. But, did the Surge cause the decline and election? Or do we have either a Post Hoc or Cum Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc (After, or With, therefore Because)? These are Causal fallacies, but we would first have to Define what is meant by "success" before saying the Surge succeeded. Does success have to be causative, or can it be coincidental? (Another point here: the term "surge" is metaphorical, and as it is a linguistic rhetorical device, probably can also be analyzed in the stasis of Definition - was it a "surge" or a "drip," for instance?)

Finally, we come to A, the core Values argument. This takes one of three forms, all posed at some point in the discussion as a rhetorical question:

Is Iraq better off now than it was under Saddam?

Is the U.S. better off now that Saddam is dead and gone?

Is the world safer now that the U.S. invaded Iraq and removed Saddam?

(Notice that these are all support the B3 Cause argument - Because Saddam was bad, it's good for Iraq or the U.S. or the World or all three that he is gone. Again, although the war's advocates try to conflate Cause and Value, they are not interchangeable: the result may be good, but the motive not - or vice-versa. Unintended Consequences do not transform a Bad Cause into a Good Value. The Value may be good, but the Cause remains bad.)

Even so, those questions are not so easy to answer. We have to revert to definition: What is meant by "better off"? What is meant by "safer"? Things might be "better" or "safer" in one way, but worse or more dangerous in another. And how do we measure the two?

As you can see, the questions are more complex than talking heads often allow. While those advocating may not want you doing this kind of analysis, forcing those presenting arguments to clarify, via stasis, what they're saying makes it easier to identify the argument, and judge its strength.

Deliberative Dilemma

Major Presidential speeches, or announcements, provide plenty of material for rhetorical analysis. President Obama's announcement that "combat operations in Iraq" have ended is no exception. As such, we might focus on many areas - the symbolism of the location, certain word choices - for instance, while "combat operations" have ended, military engagements - street fights and gun battles - have not. So we might focus on issues of definition. There are, of course, many others.

But one that seems to have escaped most commentators is what I'll call the "deliberative dilemma." According to Aristotle, there are three core issues - blame, values, or choice. They're known as forensic (who did it), epideictic - demonstrative (what good is it), and deliberative (what should we do). Later rhetoricians developed this into stasis theory, adding two other places of argument, cause and definition.

Good rhetoric, or powerful rhetoric, may combine all three issues, but one predominates. JFK's speech declaring the U.S. will put a man on the moon is deliberative. Eisenhower's farewell address is best known for its forensic assessment of the military-industrial complex. But we may argue that the deliberative forms the heart of any presidential address. I say this because the president represents the country as a whole. While the president cannot be divorced from his party or its politics, he still stands and speaks for the country as a whole. (Whether this makes him a metonymy, a synechdoche, or both, is a subject for another essay.)

The purpose of a presidential speech, then, is to bring the country together, to define our values, to express ideas that unite us and voice sentiments that motivate us. In short, the president is both cheerleader and sermonizer in chief. Before and after the speech his words are analyzed and criticized, but much of that criticism turns on how well he demonstrated the group's values - whether a sub-group of the country, or the country as a group of the whole.

This brings us to President Obama's deliberative dilemma of August 31, 2010. Let's start by focusing on the criticism: those on the left complained that Obama did not discuss the causes of the Iraq War, that he did not blame Bush and Cheney for the misinformation and lies that led us into the war, nor did he deal with the consequences in any detail. (Rachel Maddow provides a wonderful summary of the changing rationale.) Those on the right were upset that Obama did not give Bush enough credit for what they see as a positive outcome or noble motives; many mentioned specifically the "Surge," as if that was a battle that guaranteed victory.

We may call that forensic divide "fact 1" (with a nod to Sherlock Holmes). (Notice that both sides have focused on the blame/credit question.)

Fact 2: It is an election year, and the politics of Iraq have a direct impact on the politics of the economy, which will probably have a direct impact on the election, which will in turn affect President Obama's agenda and ability to lead.

Fact 3: The Iraq war not only divides the country, as did, say the Vietnam war, it also serves as a flashpoint for deep-seated and conflicting ideologies. These ideologies spring from core values, values that answer questions like, what is the nature of the country; what is our role in the world; who are our enemies, why are they our enemies, and how do we fight them. These values - beliefs, really - are almost intransigent and practically unarguable.

Fact 4: Barack Obama favors rhetorical, political and intellectual balance. It's visible in his style, his vision, and his speeches. Consider some phrases from his famous, and powerful, "More Perfect Union" speech: "Farmers and scholars; statesmen and patriots" "through protests and struggle, on the streets and in the courts, through a civil war and civil disobedience" and finally, perhaps the best known line: "I am the son of a black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas."

Fact 5: Barack Obama opposed the Iraq War from the beginning. His most vocal supporters vehemently loathe it. But summarily pulling out carries political consequences, at home and abroad. Further, independents are the most important segment of the electorate. Going back to Fact 2, Obama must be aware of his audience, and his rhetorical goal. His rhetorical goal is not simply to announce that the "combat troops" are leaving Iraq, and that in a little more than a year all troops will be out of Iraq. Nor is his rhetorical goal forensic - dealing with the "elephant in the room" - the blame (or credit) for the Iraq War. He leaves that to the analysts.

Rather, his rhetorical goal is to focus on the issues - or issue - that will define the election and to demonstrate his competence in handling it: "
Our most urgent task is to restore our economy, and put the millions of Americans who have lost their jobs back to work." So he wants to - or must - use the rhetorical moment - the Kairos of the "end of our combat mission in Iraq" - to define the issues and enhance his ethos (reinforce his credibility).

Ah, but enhance his ethos with who? Certainly not with the say-nothing, do-nothing (know-nothing) Republicans who have opposed every attempt at conversation. Nor with the Democratic party, although he must be careful with the progressives. He must present himself as favoring their views, but constrained by politics (or "reality") into modifying actions. (This becomes clearer if we understand the nature of audience - again, a subject for another essay).

Rather, his audience, the one he needs to persuade, are the independents - the middle balancers. And for them, the demonstrative must yield to the deliberative - where are we going and why.

Hence the acknowledgment of the past that frustrated his supporters and gave umbrage to his opponents. Obama stands balanced and those without a political stake - the independents - will see him, hopefully, as deliberative and full of phronesis, or practical wisdom.

And hence, the "theme" of the speech: "It is time to turn the page."

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq