[Why do one-liners - slogan-generators - succeed or fail? A comparison of Bentsen's, "You're no Jack Kennedy" to McCain's "I'm not Bush.]
"Sen. Obama, I'm not President Bush. ... If you wanted to run against President Bush, you should have run four years ago."
Oct. 15 presidential debate at Hofstra University
By many accounts, John McCain's "Senator Obama, I'm not President Bush" may be the best one-liner of the presidential debates. As one website put it, "Republican operatives could barely contain their excitement afterward - or their wish that this had been said in the first debate and not the final one." It was a great one-liner, reminiscent of another from an earlier campaign. But unlike its predecessor, this didn't define the candidate. If it had come in the first debate, it wouldn't have been a "game-changer," and may have made things worse, not better for John McCain.
The predecessor was, of course, Lloyd Bentsen's retort to Dan Quayle, "...I knew Jack Kennedy. Senator, you're no Jack Kennedy." It had much the same setting as the Obama-McCain debate: a younger, relatively inexperienced Senator against an older, veteran Senator. So youth, experience, and political philosophy were on stage. On the campaign trail, Dan Quayle had been comparing himself to JFK, while Obama had been comparing McCain to Bush. Yet in one case the one-liner not only worked, but became part of the political lexicon. In the other, it became fodder for late-night jokes, but otherwise backfired. Understanding why helps us also understand why ultimately rhetoric must match reason.
A one-liner works when it becomes a slogan, a catch-phrase. It serves much the same rhetorical purpose as a cheer at a bowl game - to establish identity. That is, if the one-liner works, the audience will approve, then adapt it. It ends up on bumper stickers. It becomes an "in" thing. (If we want to categorize the one-liner, we'd say it's a demonstrative-ethos tool - it establishes the speaker's character in a way that demonstrates he or she shares the audience's values. It's an "us vs. them" strategy, with "us" being anyone who gets the point.)
The one-liner (which followed a classic series of set-up lines, beginning with "Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy") "You're no Jack Kennedy" - or substitute some other iconic figure - now serves two parallel purposes: it deflates the opponent, or the opponent's claim, by negating an otherwise favorable analogy or comparison.
Why does Bentsen's line, and its formulation "You're no [analogous figure]", still work, while McCain's adaptation, after the initial impact, failed? We have to remember that Quayle was not comparing his accomplishments to Kennedy's accomplishments, but rather his experience to Kennedy's. But Quayle's argument was weak - and rather hubristic - to begin with. When asked what qualified him to be Vice-President, saying he'd been in the Senate longer than JFK had been doesn't really answer the question. By that reasoning we should always elect the least experienced candidate! Further, what people remember is not JFK's comparative inexperience, but his energy, leadership and accomplishments. Bentsen took advantage of the positive memories of JFK to deflate Quayle, who was in many ways JFK's political opposite.
In other words, the facts - reason - lent resonance to Bentsen's quip.
McCain's line suffered from two problems: it focused the negative on himself, and it belied his record. Make that three problems, since it thereby brought his record under the wrong microscope.
Bentsen's equation went Quayle does not equal Kennedy. McCain's went McCain does not equal Bush. If Kennedy is a positive number and Bush is a negative number and "not" means multiply by a negative, we see clearly the difference. Quayle was trying to multiply a positive (himself) by a positive (Kennedy), yielding a positive analogy, message or impression. Bentsen turned that into a negative multiplying a positive, which is always negative.
But a negative (I'm not) multiplied by a negative (Bush) is still a negative. And so, once the shock value of the denial wore off, one was left with, if not a negative, then another question: If McCain isn't Bush, who is he? The fallback answer has to be "a maverick," but that identifier had been dropped because, after McCain suspended his campaign in response to the economic crisis, "maverick" had been redefined, by Obama and the media, as "erratic."
But the other reason the one-liner didn't work was that in essence it wasn't true. McCain wasn't physically Bush, but philosophically he was. He'd voted with him 90% of the time. He boasted to Bill O'Reilly that he campaigned for and with Bush, doing everything he could to get Bush re-elected. The pictures of them hugging, or arm-in-arm, or eating birthday cake - McCain's birthday cake - the day Katrina drowned New Orleans, provided too much visual refutation.
Thus, Obama had to make only one small change to negate the line. All he had to do was add the word "policies" to the Bush-McCain identification tag.
Using the line earlier probably wouldn't have helped McCain, and it may have hurt, because it would have focused attention, in a different, perhaps more politically harmful way, on his conjunction with Bush.
As Jay Heinrichs points out in Thank You For Arguing, you can't fake decorum.
Saturday, November 1, 2008
Friday, October 31, 2008
Obama's Infomercial pt. 2
Infomercional Virtue: Strengthening the Ethos
[Summary: The rhetorical motive for the "infomercial": Strengthening Obama's Virtue, the weakest area of his ethos, an area he must strengthen if he is to govern.]
So much for the background, something that most observers - all but the "rabid right" - would acknowledge. Given that none of the major conditions - economic crisis, Democratic unity, and Republican divisiveness (internal and external) - barring some major "game-changer" (and perhaps even the capture of Bin Laden could not push aside the focus on the economy), Obama was in a position to simply play "prevent defense." That is, as he had done to some extent in the last debate, simply make sure he didn't make a mistake, to misspeak into a game-changer.
Obama also had so much money to spend that he could have flooded several "battleground states" with ads and get-out-the-vote organizers.
Why, then, go with an infomercial? Was it simply that it was safe? Well, no, there was a risk. It might make Obama seem too Hollywood, too much the celebrity and thus re-focus questions on his background. (Again, I leave out the reaction of the twenty-five percenters, the automatic "label and reject" group - although ironically some of them have begun to modify their virulence having "seen the handwriting on the wall.")
Well, the infomercial certainly dominated the news cycle. (Obama's rally in Florida and appearance on The Daily Show immediately after didn't hurt, either.)
But I think the infomercial was produced not only to influence voters before the election, but also, and in some ways primarily, to reassure citizens after the election. That is, Obama and his staff recognized that despite the active support of the Clintons, a phenomenal grassroots/internet support system, the mainstream media's rejection of the guilt-by-association, character-assassination narrative, and powerful endorsements, such as that of Colin Powell, Obama still had an ethos problem.
Obama's very strength, in terms of ethos, highlighted his weakness: his rhetoric, his balanced, even nuanced approach to problems, his instinct to step back and consider rather than engage and fight, emphasized both his practical wisdom and his disinterest, elements necessary to establish one's ethos, to make people comfortable with and follow one's leadership. As Jay Heinrichs has noted, Democrats have traditionally been strong on these traits, particularly disinterest.
However, the primary ethos trait is virtue - or, a sharing of values. It's an instinctive response, not so much do I like this person as can I trust him or her? Does this person understand me? We go to teachers for information and the office clerk for directions how to get our forms filled out correctly. But we don't go to them for advice about our relationships or budgets. For that we turn to the bartender or barber.
And Obama recognized that, assuming he won, he'd have to become a fixture in the community. Think of Andy Griffith, the laid-back sheriff of rural Mayberrry. Everyone knew he was smart, but he didn't make a boast of it. He treated everyone as if they were as smart as he was, and he went fishing.
What Obama had to do, in otherwise, was establish his virtue. He had to do it, or at least lay the groundwork, before the election. Afterwards, virtue moves would be limited by the politics of transition and governance. "American Stories, American Solutions" can be seen not so much as an extended campaign speech, or even a made-for-TV documentary, but a get-to-know-you, a personalization of Barack Obama.
From its dramatic structure to its dialogue and characterization, it was first and foremost a narrative. And like any good narrative, whether prose, graphic or film, its goal was to establish an identification of the audience with the protagonist, so much so that "when that Caesar has cried, the poor have wept."
Next: A look at the dramatic structure, from the title to the plot.
[Summary: The rhetorical motive for the "infomercial": Strengthening Obama's Virtue, the weakest area of his ethos, an area he must strengthen if he is to govern.]
So much for the background, something that most observers - all but the "rabid right" - would acknowledge. Given that none of the major conditions - economic crisis, Democratic unity, and Republican divisiveness (internal and external) - barring some major "game-changer" (and perhaps even the capture of Bin Laden could not push aside the focus on the economy), Obama was in a position to simply play "prevent defense." That is, as he had done to some extent in the last debate, simply make sure he didn't make a mistake, to misspeak into a game-changer.
Obama also had so much money to spend that he could have flooded several "battleground states" with ads and get-out-the-vote organizers.
Why, then, go with an infomercial? Was it simply that it was safe? Well, no, there was a risk. It might make Obama seem too Hollywood, too much the celebrity and thus re-focus questions on his background. (Again, I leave out the reaction of the twenty-five percenters, the automatic "label and reject" group - although ironically some of them have begun to modify their virulence having "seen the handwriting on the wall.")
Well, the infomercial certainly dominated the news cycle. (Obama's rally in Florida and appearance on The Daily Show immediately after didn't hurt, either.)
But I think the infomercial was produced not only to influence voters before the election, but also, and in some ways primarily, to reassure citizens after the election. That is, Obama and his staff recognized that despite the active support of the Clintons, a phenomenal grassroots/internet support system, the mainstream media's rejection of the guilt-by-association, character-assassination narrative, and powerful endorsements, such as that of Colin Powell, Obama still had an ethos problem.
Obama's very strength, in terms of ethos, highlighted his weakness: his rhetoric, his balanced, even nuanced approach to problems, his instinct to step back and consider rather than engage and fight, emphasized both his practical wisdom and his disinterest, elements necessary to establish one's ethos, to make people comfortable with and follow one's leadership. As Jay Heinrichs has noted, Democrats have traditionally been strong on these traits, particularly disinterest.
However, the primary ethos trait is virtue - or, a sharing of values. It's an instinctive response, not so much do I like this person as can I trust him or her? Does this person understand me? We go to teachers for information and the office clerk for directions how to get our forms filled out correctly. But we don't go to them for advice about our relationships or budgets. For that we turn to the bartender or barber.
And Obama recognized that, assuming he won, he'd have to become a fixture in the community. Think of Andy Griffith, the laid-back sheriff of rural Mayberrry. Everyone knew he was smart, but he didn't make a boast of it. He treated everyone as if they were as smart as he was, and he went fishing.
What Obama had to do, in otherwise, was establish his virtue. He had to do it, or at least lay the groundwork, before the election. Afterwards, virtue moves would be limited by the politics of transition and governance. "American Stories, American Solutions" can be seen not so much as an extended campaign speech, or even a made-for-TV documentary, but a get-to-know-you, a personalization of Barack Obama.
From its dramatic structure to its dialogue and characterization, it was first and foremost a narrative. And like any good narrative, whether prose, graphic or film, its goal was to establish an identification of the audience with the protagonist, so much so that "when that Caesar has cried, the poor have wept."
Next: A look at the dramatic structure, from the title to the plot.
Obama's Infomercial pt. 1
Plotting Obama's Ethos: American Stories, American Solutions
I'm reminded every single day, that I am not a perfect man. I will not be a perfect president. But I can promise you this, I will always tell you what I think and where I stand; I will always be honest with you about the challenges we face. I will listen to you when we disagree, and most importantly I will open the doors of government and ask you to be involved in your democracy again.
[Summary: Obama's "infomercial," aired less than a week before the election, played against the backdrop of a stable lead in the polls. The stability created the Kairos - the right timing - for the infomercial. But what caused the stability in the polls?]
As should be the case, the most impressive part Obama's half-hour "infomercial," aired less than a week before the election, was the conclusion. By impressive, I mean the most emotionally moving. Rhetorically that's the way it should be, of course. The classic plot of any argument goes ethos, logos, pathos: establish character, make the argument (tell the story), give the audience something to take home, something to act on.
It's worth examining at length, though, how Obama gets there, and wherein lies the power of that ending. To do that, we have to go back, back to the beginning, but in a sense even before the beginning. As I emphasize in my classes, if Kairos isn't everything, it's pretty close; match it with context, and it is everything. Jokes require not only good timing, but the right location. The funniest joke, told by the best comic, just doesn't belong at wedding.
So let's back up and look at the Kairos and context that produced, generated, the "infomercial."
A week before the election Obama was comfortably ahead in both national polls and projected electoral college votes. While many factors contributed to this situation, we isolate three factors that seemed to have created a relatively stable and immovable voter response:
1) The economic crisis. This trumped the "wedge" issues with which the Republicans demonized in the past. It also put the war in Iraq on the back-burner. Although, judging from his performance in the primary, Obama probably would have done well enough had foreign policy been, as many expected, the primary issue, he would have been playing on McCain's field. So the political narrative appeared to be a refutation of the operational philosophy of the ruling fragment of the Republican party.
2) A healing within the Democratic party. Obama suffered from a number of "character issues" - questions about past associations and his views on a number of issues. Short on experience, at least national experience (a fact that reminded supporters of the other Illinois president) his powerful rhetoric ironically often emphasized the thinness of his resume. That he was half-Black, and had been active in the Black community, raised the alarum in several key constituencies - working class White males and Jews, in particular. Getting the Clintons on board, his performance in the debates and the active, almost revolutionary, support of the blogosphere and net community helped counter, or neutralize, some of the more vile and absurd attempts at character assassination. While many of the middle-ground supporters may have remained suspicious, they were willing to grant Obama some "credit by association" and take a chance.
3) The chaotic implosion of the McCain campaign. As others noted, perhaps most pointedly former President Clinton in his first joint appearance with Obama, the two presidential decisions of the campaign highlighted not just the erratic - into which the maverick can degenerate - thought process of McCain, but a startling, probably unconscious, contempt for the conventions of civility and communication. Sarah Palin had such a narrow appeal, and was so manifestly not only unprepared but demagogic that the more she appealed to the base, the more she offended the rather vast swath of moderate and disengaged voters. McCain's "suspension" of his campaign once the economic crisis broke was seen as just another political trick, depressing in its cynicism.
[Next: The Ethos of the Infomercial]
I'm reminded every single day, that I am not a perfect man. I will not be a perfect president. But I can promise you this, I will always tell you what I think and where I stand; I will always be honest with you about the challenges we face. I will listen to you when we disagree, and most importantly I will open the doors of government and ask you to be involved in your democracy again.
[Summary: Obama's "infomercial," aired less than a week before the election, played against the backdrop of a stable lead in the polls. The stability created the Kairos - the right timing - for the infomercial. But what caused the stability in the polls?]
As should be the case, the most impressive part Obama's half-hour "infomercial," aired less than a week before the election, was the conclusion. By impressive, I mean the most emotionally moving. Rhetorically that's the way it should be, of course. The classic plot of any argument goes ethos, logos, pathos: establish character, make the argument (tell the story), give the audience something to take home, something to act on.
It's worth examining at length, though, how Obama gets there, and wherein lies the power of that ending. To do that, we have to go back, back to the beginning, but in a sense even before the beginning. As I emphasize in my classes, if Kairos isn't everything, it's pretty close; match it with context, and it is everything. Jokes require not only good timing, but the right location. The funniest joke, told by the best comic, just doesn't belong at wedding.
So let's back up and look at the Kairos and context that produced, generated, the "infomercial."
A week before the election Obama was comfortably ahead in both national polls and projected electoral college votes. While many factors contributed to this situation, we isolate three factors that seemed to have created a relatively stable and immovable voter response:
1) The economic crisis. This trumped the "wedge" issues with which the Republicans demonized in the past. It also put the war in Iraq on the back-burner. Although, judging from his performance in the primary, Obama probably would have done well enough had foreign policy been, as many expected, the primary issue, he would have been playing on McCain's field. So the political narrative appeared to be a refutation of the operational philosophy of the ruling fragment of the Republican party.
2) A healing within the Democratic party. Obama suffered from a number of "character issues" - questions about past associations and his views on a number of issues. Short on experience, at least national experience (a fact that reminded supporters of the other Illinois president) his powerful rhetoric ironically often emphasized the thinness of his resume. That he was half-Black, and had been active in the Black community, raised the alarum in several key constituencies - working class White males and Jews, in particular. Getting the Clintons on board, his performance in the debates and the active, almost revolutionary, support of the blogosphere and net community helped counter, or neutralize, some of the more vile and absurd attempts at character assassination. While many of the middle-ground supporters may have remained suspicious, they were willing to grant Obama some "credit by association" and take a chance.
3) The chaotic implosion of the McCain campaign. As others noted, perhaps most pointedly former President Clinton in his first joint appearance with Obama, the two presidential decisions of the campaign highlighted not just the erratic - into which the maverick can degenerate - thought process of McCain, but a startling, probably unconscious, contempt for the conventions of civility and communication. Sarah Palin had such a narrow appeal, and was so manifestly not only unprepared but demagogic that the more she appealed to the base, the more she offended the rather vast swath of moderate and disengaged voters. McCain's "suspension" of his campaign once the economic crisis broke was seen as just another political trick, depressing in its cynicism.
[Next: The Ethos of the Infomercial]
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)